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INTRODUCTION 
This Article reassesses the Turkey-European Union trade 
relationship in light of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the 
history of Turkish accession to the European Union. It argues that the 
Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in Yedaş Tarim should have used more explicitly the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel as an equitable devise to create liability for 
the potential detriment suffered by Turkey in relying on the promises 
made by Brussels. Part I provides a short overview of Turkey-
European Union relations from the early 1950s until today, with 
particular attention to accession negotiations and the trade 
relationship between Turkey and The European Economic 
Community. Turkey’s 1987 application for European Community 
(EC) membership began a tortuous path for the aspiring new member 
marked by Turkey’s efforts to meet the European criteria for 
accession. In 1995 Turkey became the first member of the European 
Community Customs Union without being at the same time an 
official candidate for accession.1 This anomalous situation is central 
to this Article’s claims about the unbalanced Turkey-European 
Union trade relationship. Turkey was compelled to make serious 
political, economic and administrative reforms to work towards E.U. 
membership.  The failure of those reforms to bring about concrete 
progress towards accession began to foster Turkish government and 
public distrust of Brussels. 
In 1999, The European Council finally decided that Turkey would 
be officially considered a candidate of accession after Greece lifted 
its veto on the Turkish candidacy.2 As of 2008, the Commission’s 
latest progress report shows modest improvements in the country’s 
economic and democratic institutions, but it nevertheless continues 
 
 1. See Meltem Müftüler-Bac & Lauren M. McLaren, Enlargement 
Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey, 25 J. 
EUR. INTEGRATION 17, 20 (2003) (noting that Turkey is the only country to have 
concluded a customs union prior to full EU membership). 
 2. See Patrick R. Hugg, Cyprus in Europe: Seizing the Momentum of Nice, 34 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1293, 1328 (2001) (explaining that the rapprochement 
between Turkey and Greece ultimately led to both Cyprus and Turkey becoming 
candidates for accession). 
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the ongoing negotiation process.3 Turkey’s difficulties in navigating 
the accession process over twenty years has created a backlash 
among Turkish political and legal elites who question whether 
accession is even worth pursuing. While many factors have 
contributed to this backlash, a primary cause is the increasingly 
unbalanced trade relationship between the European Union and 
Turkey. While the European Union imposes unilateral obligations on 
Turkey and has largely benefited from the Customs Union, Turkey 
has suffered economic losses as a result of efforts to comply with 
trade and legal obligations mandated by Brussels, and Turkey 
receives little of the financial help that the European Union normally 
grants to its future members.4 Not surprisingly, Brussels’ behavior 
has engendered a deep frustration among the Turkish political and 
legal elites by not living up to its promise of strengthening both sides 
of the trade relationship. 
Part II analyses the Yedaş Tarim decisions by the CFI and ECJ in 
order to show the Turkish legal elites’ frustration with the 
unbalanced Turkey-European Union trade relationship. This part 
focuses on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, developed in 
common law jurisdictions and more broadly adopted in international 
law. In promissory estoppel cases, a party invokes the equitable 
enforcement of a promise that was technically not fully binding and 
yet induced the claimant’s detrimental reliance. The doctrine of 
promissory estoppel entitles the claimant to damages for the 
detriment suffered. Yedaş Tarim, the applicant before the Court of 
First Instance (CFI), invoked a number of unfulfilled promises that 
the European Union made to Turkey in the aftermath of the Ankara 
Association Agreement and that over time have worsened rather than 
strengthened the Turkish balance of trade.5 Nevertheless, in this case 
 
 3. See generally Turkey 2008 Progress Report Accompanying the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, COM (2208) 674 
final (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Turkey 2008 Progress Report] (acknowledging 
Turkey’s improvement in certain areas but noting deficiencies in the 
implementation of democratic and political reforms). 
 4. See infra Part III.1 (discussing hardships imposed on Turkey by the 
imbalanced Turkey-EU trade relationships). 
 5. See, e.g., Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ 
v. Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶¶ 36, 47. 
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the Court found no detriment for the claimant and no liability for the 
European Union.6 
Part III places Yedaş Tarim in the broader context of the existing 
trade relation between Turkey and the European Union created by 
the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963 and its subsequent 
protocol. The obligations undertaken by Turkey vis à vis the free 
movement of workers and services in the common market and vis à 
vis the E.U. foreign commercial policy have created certain 
economic patterns, such as the migration of Turkish workers and 
their families. Moreover, Turkey’s obligations have prompted new 
disputes in which Turkey became a defendant before the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) for infringing its multilateral 
obligations.7 This Article questions the reasoning of the European 
courts in Yedaş Tarim through a broader understanding of the 
anomalous and unbalanced trade relationship between Turkey and 
the European Union. 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION SINCE THE 1950S 
A. THE TORTUOUS PATH FROM ANKARA TO BRUSSELS 
After entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1952 and joining the Council of Europe in 1949, Turkey signed the 
Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1963. This Association Agreement was based on Article 238 of 
the Treaty of Rome, which established that European countries with 
stable democracies and market economies could seek accession to 
become full members of the Community.8 Thus, the Ankara 
Association Agreement represented a first step for Turkey towards a 
 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18 (detailing the Court’s holding in 
Yedaş Tarim). 
 7. See Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products, ¶¶ 2-3, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter WTO 
Appellate Body Report on Turkish Textiles] (describing India’s claim against 
Turkey for imposing trade restrictions required by its agreement with the EU). 
 8. Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey, Sept. 1, 1963, 1964 O.J. (217) 3687 [hereinafter Ankara 
Agreement]. 
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full membership in the EEC.9 The Ankara Agreement set in place a 
three-step process which began with the establishment of a customs 
union and a trade liberalization regime between Turkey and the 
EEC.10  
The three stages consisted of a preparatory phase, followed by a 
transitional and a final phase during which the association between 
Turkey and the EEC would create closer economic ties and facilitate 
Turkish membership.11 During the preparatory stage, the EEC was 
supposed to give financial aid to Turkey to strengthen its economy in 
light of their future long-term relation.12 The creation of a Customs 
Union was part of the final stage of the Ankara Agreement, which 
was concluded in 1995 and implemented by 1996.13 The Ankara 
Agreement also created some institutions such as the Council of 
Association, with the task of monitoring, implementing, and 
improving the exchange of information between the contracting 
parties.14 In the 1970s an Additional Protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement was signed to mark the end of a preparatory phase and 
Turkey’s entrance into a transitional stage.15 The Additional Protocol 
aimed to conclude the Customs Union between the parties, and the 
EEC committed to providing financial assistance to Turkey by 
 
 9. See id. art. 28 (“As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced 
far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations 
arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall 
examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.”). 
 10. See id. art. 2 (outlining the agreement’s principles and specific steps to 
Turkish economic and trade development); see also Meltem Müftüler-Baç, The 
Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics, 34 E. EUR. Q. 159, 160-66 
(2000) (reviewing Turkey’s compliance with the three steps required by the 
Association Agreement). 
 11. Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 3, 4, 10. 
 12. See id. art. 3 (specifying that Turkey will fulfill its obligations during the 
preparatory stage “with aid from the Community”). 
 13. Id. art. 4(2). 
 14. See id. arts. 6, 22-25, 27 (establishing the Council of Association and 
delineating its functions). 
 15. See id. art. 3(2) (stating “[t]he change-over to the transitional stage shall be 
effected in accordance with Article 1 of the Provisional Protocol”); Additional 
Protocol and Financial Protocol Signed on 23 November 1970, Annexed to the 
Agreement Establishing the Association Between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey and on Measures to be Taken for their Entry into Force, 
pmbl., 1972 O.J. (L 293) 4 [hereinafter Additional Protocol] (asserting “the 
conditions have been established for passing from the preparatory stage to the 
transitional stage”). 
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several means including loans.16 Furthermore, the Additional 
Protocol extended the protections of the four freedoms—goods, 
services, capitals and workers—to Turkish citizens and aimed to 
harmonize Turkish law with EEC directives.17 
When Turkey officially applied for full membership in the 
European Community in 1987, several other Mediterranean countries 
had just joined.18 Rather than accepting the Turkish request, the 
Commission deferred the negotiation for accession based on the fact 
that the Turkish democracy was not stable yet.19 The Kurdish as well 
as the Cypriot problems were still looming in foreign policy.20 But 
what made the Turkish candidacy more daunting in the European 
public opinion were the recurrent human rights violations together 
with the economic “backwardness” of the country.21 Thus the 
 
 16. See Additional Protocol, supra note 15, at pmbl. (aiming for a “progressive 
establishment of a customs union” between Turkey and the E.U.); Financial 
Protocol Annexed to the Agreement Establishing the Association Between the 
European Economic Community and Turkey, arts. 1-3, Nov. 23, 1970, 1972 O.J. 
(L 293) 4 [hereinafter Financial Protocol] (setting out the process by which Turkey 
may apply for financial aid from the EEC). 
 17. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 9 
[hereinafter Treaty on European Union] (mandating progressive abolition of 
restrictions on the free movement of goods, capital, workers, and services, thereby 
opening European markets and creating a free trade regime); Additional Protocol, 
supra note 15, tits. I-II (requiring progressive implementation of provisions for the 
free movement of goods, persons, and services); see also Bahri Yilmaz, The 
Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? 2 (Ctr. for 
European Studies, Working Paper No. 167, 2008), available at 
http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/ docs/pdfs/CES_167.pdf (referring to 
the freedom of trade, freedom of movement of labor, freedom of movement of 
persons, and freedom of movement of capital as the “four freedoms”). 
 18. See EUROPA, 1980-1989: The Changing Face of Europe – The Fall of the 
Berlin Wall, http://europa.ed/abc/history/1980-1989/index_en.htm (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2009) (reporting that Greece joined the EC in 1981, followed by Spain 
and Portugal in 1986). 
 19. Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the 
Community. SEC (89) 2290 final, ¶¶ 10-11 (Dec. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Turkey’s 
Request for Accession]. 
 20. See id. ¶ 9 (finding Turkey deficient “in the human rights situation and in 
respect for the identity of minorities”); see also Mehmet Ögütçü, Turkey’s Place in 
the New Architecture of Europe: An Updated Assessment, Oct. 2008, 
http://egemenlikulusundur.org/ustat/ulastra/ogutcu2IV.htm (chronicling the 
negative European response to Turkey’s “Kurdish problem”). 
 21. See Manfred Nowak, Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry 
to, and Full Participation in, the EU, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 687, 691-92 
(Philip Alston et al. eds., 1999) (clarifying why since the 1980s the EU began 
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European Community further delayed Turkey’s accession and 
adopted instead the Matutes Package, geared to facilitate technical 
and financial assistance and conclude the Customs Union in 1995.22 
In 1997, during the European Council in Luxembourg, the European 
Union made clear that Turkey would not be included among the 
candidates to start the accession negotiations.23 Not surprisingly this 
statement triggered an angry Turkish reaction.24 According to the 
Copenhagen criteria established by the European Union in 1993, 
Turkey did not fulfill the requirements to join liberal, western 
democratic, and market regimes.25  
These criteria, conditional to future membership, mandated that 
E.U. applicants fulfill three different objectives. First, applicants 
must have “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities.” 
Second, they must have a “functioning market economy.” Lastly, 
they must be able “to take on the obligations of political, economic, 
and monetary union.”26 The Copenhagen criteria also included 
Agenda 2000, a document supporting E.U. eastward enlargement by 
including the former ten Communist countries while excluding 
Turkey from the list.27 Moreover, the Agenda recommended that 
 
assuming the responsibility for promoting human rights as well as political 
identities among its members); see also David Kennedy, Turning to Market 
Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 382-85 (1991) 
(explaining how in European legal consciousness the linking of democratic 
practices to free trade regimes has been a successful strategy). 
 22. See HARUN ARIKAN, TURKEY AND THE EU: AN AWKWARD CANDIDATE FOR 
EU MEMBERSHIP? 72-73 (2d ed. 2006) (“The Matutes Package provided the main 
base for the EU to implement its containment policy for Turkey. In fact, the 
instruments of the Package were suited well [to] the EU’s containment policy for 
Turkey, designed to strengthen EU-Turkey relations, while delaying the possibility 
of actual Turkish membership in the foreseeable future.”). 
 23. See Yilmaz, supra note 17, at 8-9 (noting that despite “the dawn of a new 
era” with the end of 1997, Turkey would continue to maintain a special status and 
not be a candidate for accession negotiation). 
 24. See Müftüler-Baç, supra note 10, at 162-63 (reporting on political and 
public reactions in Turkey to the EU’s rejection, including Turkey’s accusing the 
EU of “erecting a cultural Berlin Wall”). 
 25. See Christos Kassimeris & Lina Tsoumpanou, The Impact of the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on 
Turkey’s EU Candidacy, 12 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 329, 334 (2008) (underscoring the 
EU’s focus on Turkey’s shortcomings in the human rights arena). 
 26. See Ian Barnes & Pamela Barnes, Enlargement, in EUROPEAN UNION 
POLITICS 421, 426 (Michelle Cini ed., 2007). 
 27. See Communication of the Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and 
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Turkey should increase its human rights standards and create more 
protections for different minority groups in its territory.28 The 
recommendations of Agenda 2000 and the following rejection of 
Turkish accession created a strong backlash among Turkish political 
elites, who considered it a “slap in the face” from Brussels.29 
Finally, during the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the 
European Union recognized Turkey as a candidate for accession 
similar to the Eastern European countries.30 Despite the little 
improvement on the human rights front, the Helsinki summit 
declared that “Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union 
on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate 
states.”31 The Commission Reports in 2000 and 2003, closely 
monitoring the Turkish situation, cautioned the European Union on 
the limited features of the Turkish democratic system. According to 
the Commission, Turkey ought to deepen its pledges to democracy 
and the rule of law through institutional reform.32  
 
Wider Union, DOC 97/6, at 95 (July 15, 1997) [hereinafter Agenda 2000] (listing 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Cyprus as enlargement candidates); 
EUROPA, Activities of the European Union—Summaries of Legislation, Agenda 
2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/ 
en/lvb/l60001.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (declaring that the possibility of 
absorbing the ten former Communist countries was “one of the major reasons for 
the Agenda 2000 reforms”). 
 28. See Agenda 2000, supra note 27, at 56-57 (commending Turkey on its 
customs union but noting that its political structure and pursuit of democracy have 
not yet achieved sufficient improvements). 
 29. Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, supra note 25, at 334. 
 30. See id. at 335; see also Treaty on European Union, supra note 17, tit. VII, 
art. O (describing the accession procedure). Any European State may apply for 
membership. Id. After a State’s submission of a formal application, the 
Commission presents an opinion to the Council, which acts unanimously after 
receiving assent by an absolute majority of the Parliament. Id. 
 31. Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, supra note 25, at 335. 
 32. See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2000 REGULAR REPORT 
FROM THE COMMISSION ON TURKEY’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 12-14 
(2000) [hereinafter 2000 REGULAR REPORT], available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf (asserting that although 
Turkey has made efforts at reform, those efforts are not making sufficient 
progress); COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2003 REGULAR REPORT 
FROM THE COMMISSION ON TURKEY’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 43-45 
(2003) [hereinafter Turkey Progress Report 2003], available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf (outlining 
several advances but continuing to identify inconsistencies or lack of 
implementation in the democratic systems and rule of law). 
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In the meantime, from the 1980s until 2001 Turkey began 
adopting a number of harmonization packages and technical 
measures constituting the acquis communautaire (the cumulative law 
of the European Union) with the hope of speeding up the application 
process.33 In 2002, the Copenhagen European Council stated that it 
would immediately start the negotiations with Turkey in 2004 if, on 
the basis of a Commission’s report, the country fulfilled the 
Copenhagen criteria.34 While the accession negotiations between the 
European Union and Turkey started in October 2005, of the thirty-
five chapters of the acquis that were opened, only one was closed in 
2006.35 
Meanwhile, Olli Rehn, the Commissioner responsible for 
Enlargement, stated that the negotiation process with Turkey was 
likely to be “a long, difficult, and tortuous journey.”36 At this point, 
on top of the foreign policy tensions with Cyprus and the explosive 
Kurdish situation in part of the country, the Commission identified 
several other problems likely to create serious impediments to the 
Turkish accession.37 For instance, the government kept in place those 
 
 33. See Esin Örücü, Seven Packages towards Harmonisation with the 
European Union, 10 EUR. PUB. L. 603, 603-07 (2004) (describing the seven 
harmonization packages that make fundamental changes in crucial areas of law in 
an attempt to move Turkey towards integration into the EU). 
 34. Presidency Conclusions of Copenhagen European Council (Dec. 2002),  
¶ 19 [hereinafter 2002 Presidency Conclusions] (promising negotiations without 
delay if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen criteria). 
 35. See Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2006 Progress 
Report, at 4, COM (2006) 649 final (Nov. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Turkey 2006 
Progress Report] (noting that negotiations on the science and research chapter 
were provisionally closed). 
 36. See José Casanova, The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey 
into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization, 13 CONSTELLATIONS 234, 
234 (2006) (attributing in part the difficulties with Turkey’s accession to the 
“nativist anxieties over predominantly Muslim immigration”). 
 37. See Vedat Can Yeğinsü, Europe’s Janus-Faced Rights: Ankara Caught 
between Brussels and Strasbourg 8-10 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author) (identifying four categories of obstacles preventing Turkey’s 
accession to the EU: “politically-motivated restrictions on personal and individual 
liberties, political activity, and freedom of expression and association”; “legal and 
administrative anachronisms resulting from structures in Turkey which have not 
[kept] apace of global developments, in particular industrialisation and 
urbanisation”; “serious political decay – corruption, weakness of civilian 
institutions vis-à-vis the military, and general and endemic administrative 
inefficiency”; and “cultural and religious issues with deep roots both within 
Turkish society and, more specifically, the attitudes of local administrators”). 
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restrictions imposed by the military regime of 1980-1983 on personal 
and individual liberties, such as freedom of association and 
expression.38 Another problematic issue was the “administrative 
anachronism” pervading bureaucratic and judicial practices, often 
under scrutiny for transparency and corruption problems.39 Finally, 
the widespread fear that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
will transform Turkey into a Muslim fundamentalist state is very 
much alive in Europe.40 In this perspective, the resurgence of Laicité 
(secularism) in France has delayed even further the prospects of 
accession for Turkey.41 The long journey from Ankara to Brussels is 
far from being over, and as a result, the backlash among the Turkish 
public has turned the hope of westernizing and modernizing the 
country into a deep disillusionment towards the entire E.U. accession 
process.42 
Recently, the 2008 Progress Report published by the European 
Commission analyzed the Turkish situation in light of the political 
and economic criteria for membership, and reviewed the Turkish 
capacity to implement the E.U. secondary legislation and policies.43 
The Progress Report clarifies the strategic importance of Turkey not 
only to secure the E.U. energy policy, especially in light of the 
strategic role that Turkey played during the Russia-Georgia crisis, 
but also to secure European borders and prevent conflicts.44 
 
 38. ERGON ÖZBUDUN, CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICS: CHALLENGES TO 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 119-20 (2000) (describing a situation where, 
although it has relinquished its formal powers, the military still wields considerable 
power over domestic affairs). 
 39. Yeğinsü, supra note 30, at 9-10. 
 40. See Casanova, supra note 36, at 240 (arguing that despite European 
prejudices, Turkey’s current representative democracy evidences its readiness to 
join the EU). 
 41. See C.D. Lovejoy, Comment, A Glimpse into the Future: What Şahin v. 
Turkey Means to France’s Ban on Ostensibly Religious Symbols in Public Schools, 
24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 661, 683-84 (2006) (describing how Islamic beliefs can be at 
odds with the French concept of secularism, particularly in the context of France’s 
headscarf ban). 
 42. See Vincent Boland, The Feeling is Mutual: Why Turks are Growing 
Disillusioned with Europe, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at 13 (observing that Turkish 
support for EU membership has declined from over 67% to about 35%); cf. 
Europeanisation of Turkish Democracy?, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2003 
(explaining that despite disillusionment by the Turkish public, the country 
continues to undergo reforms in an attempt to achieve accession negotiations). 
 43. See generally Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 3. 
 44. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
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Despite the current financial crises, the Progress Report highlights 
the increasing economic interdependence between the European 
Union and Turkey and the solidity of the Turkish economy.45 The 
Report acknowledges some shortcomings in the realm of the 
economic criteria for the accession, but overall it states that “Turkey 
is a functioning market economy. It should be able to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the 
medium term, provided it implements its comprehensive reform 
programme in order to address structural weaknesses.”46 In assessing 
the economic criteria for membership, the Commission 
acknowledges that Turkey has made important progress in those 
areas relevant to accession, such as the regulation of free movement 
of goods, intellectual property rights, anti-trust policy, energy, 
enterprise and industrial policy, and consumer protection.47 
However, the Progress Report points to the recent political 
tensions between the Turkish Constitutional Court and the ruling 
Turkish party by suggesting that: “[A] new impetus now needs to be 
given to reform, in order to strengthen democracy and human rights, 
to modernize and develop the country and to bring it closer to the 
[European Union].”48 Human rights, the protection of minorities, and 
women’s rights appear to be some of the most controversial issues on 
which the Commission argues that Turkey has made limited 
progress.49 With respect to human rights and the protection of 
minorities, the Commission affirms that Turkey needs a more 
 
Parliament: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, at 2, COM 
(2008) 674 final (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Enlargement Strategy 2008-09] 
(stating that “Turkey’s strategic importance to the EU has further increased in key 
areas such as energy security, conflict prevention and resolution and regional 
security in the Southern Caucasus and the Middle East”). 
 45. Id. at 6 (acknowledging that “Turkey is now a functioning market economy 
in terms of the Copenhagen economic criteria”). 
 46. Id. at 63. 
 47. See id. at 64-65 (illustrating that despite some progress in economic and 
monetary policy, Turkey must continue to confront several shortcomings vis-à-vis 
the “full independence of the central bank, the monetary financing of the public 
sector and privileged access by the public sector to financial markets.”). 
 48. Id. at 5. 
49. Id. at 61-62 (explaining that one important factor in Turkey’s failure to 
meet the Copenhagen criteria is that despite a framework for women’s rights and 
gender equality, more efforts are necessary to actually realize those rights). See 
Rachel Rebouché, The Substance of Substantive Equality: Gender Equality and 
Turkey’s Headscarf Debate, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 713 (2009). 
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vigorous implementation the judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) by upgrading the “institutional framework 
for promoting and enforcing human rights.”50  
The Progress Report is harsh in describing the attitude of the 
Turkish government towards minority rights in which “Turkey made 
no progress on alignment with European standards.”51 The 
Commission points to the restrictions on using other languages other 
than Turkish in political life as well as in the media.52 Moreover, 
minorities such as the Roma not only face a discriminatory treatment 
in social protection and the employment context, but they also face 
forced evictions in entire neighborhoods demolished by the 
government.53 A similar problem exists in the southeast part of the 
country with the Kurdish minorities. Here, according to the 
Commission, the government needs to undertake further initiatives 
“to create the conditions for the predominantly Kurdish population to 
enjoy full rights and freedoms.”54 
There, however, some critical considerations on both the 
procedure and the substance of the Progress Report. The type of 
scrutiny that the Commission exercises every year in its reports 
prompts the question of whether it is relevant to assess the 
discriminatory treatment of minorities such as Roma in Turkey. 
Especially when in the rest of the European Union such a minority 
has not encountered much better treatment. Recently a few cases 
before the ECtHR against Greece and the Czech Republic have 
condemned these countries for the discriminatory treatment of Roma 
children in relation to education.55 In this respect, commentators have 
 
 50. Id. at 61. 
 51. Id. at 62. 
 52. Id.; see also Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 3, at 24-26 
(explaining that government-imposed restrictions “make broadcasting in languages 
other than Turkish cumbersome and non-viable commercially”). 
 53. Enlargement Strategy 2008-09, supra note 44, at 62; Turkey 2008 Progress 
Report, supra note 3, at 26. 
 54. Enlargement Strategy 2008-09, supra note 44, at 62. 
 55. See Affaire Sampanis et Autres c. Grèce [Sampanis and others v. Greece], 
No. 32526/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 5, 2008), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/ 
viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649
&key=71025&sessionId=21453468&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true; D.H. and 
others v. Czech Republic, No. 57325/00, ¶¶ 205-210 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 13, 
2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69 
A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=22598&sessionId=21453680&sk
in=hudoc-en&attachment=true (finding that the establishment of a separate 
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pointed out a paradoxical consequence of compliance with the 
accession criteria and the Commission’s strict scrutiny, which occurs 
only before, rather than after E.U. accession. For example, Bruno de 
Witte and Gabriel Toggenburg said that perhaps “accession will lead 
to a reduction of the European human rights standards for the 
candidate countries, and could therefore lead to a reduction of their 
actual respect for human rights.”56  
Even if this scenario appears rather extreme the scrutiny of human 
rights prompts to another question. If, according to the Commission, 
the economic criteria are more in tune than the political and human 
rights ones with the conditions of accession set up by the European 
Union, the latter seem also less objective and more open to 
manipulation. Not surprisingly, the Commission Report’s detailed 
scrutiny of the democratic conditions and the situations that could 
lead to human rights violations in Turkey has been widely 
commented upon as an “excuse for resisting Turkey’s membership, 
while the ‘real’ reasons could be traced to various political 
considerations.”57 Human rights violations and the discriminatory 
treatment of minorities have been the reason used over and over by 
the European Union to postpone Turkish accession in a way that 
seems to conceal deeper political and cultural problems, such as the 
geography, the large population, and the dominance of Islam in 
Turkey. 
B. THE SMOOTHER PATH OF THE TRADE REGIME 
Even though Turkey undertook numerous reforms toward 
democratization, and the trade regime between the European Union 
and Turkey is fully operative, the long and tortuous path towards 
 
education system for Roma children had resulted in de facto segregation and 
discrimination). 
 56. See Bruno de Witte and Gabriel N. Toggenburg, Human Rights and 
Membership of the European Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 59, 69 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004) 
(suggesting that this might be a potential problem “for those matters which, 
although duly examined in the human rights sections of the pre-accession reports, 
are not evidently within the scope of EC internal competence, such as: the rights of 
children, prison conditions and minority protection”). The authors further theorize 
that “the EU institutions will suddenly have to cease being interested in minority 
protection in Latvia, children’s rights in Romania and prison conditions in the 
Czech Republic, once these countries have joined the EU.” Id. 
 57. Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, supra note 18, at 339. 
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membership is far from coming to an end. The Commission 
announced several times that the negotiation process would be open-
ended.58 Despite the uncertainty about the Turkish accession, trade 
between the Union and Turkey has continuously expanded over 
time.59 The Commission’s website states that the European Union 
and Turkey “enjoy a deep trade relationship” and that the Union is 
“number one in both Turkey’s imports and exports while Turkey 
ranks 7th in the [European Union]’s top import and 5th in export 
markets.”60 Finally, in the 2008 Progress Report, the Commission 
states that the European Community-Turkey Customs Union 
contributes increasing bilateral trade that has reached nearly 100 
billion Euros in 2006 and made Turkey one of the European Union’s 
major trading partners.61 
From 1996 until today, however, the Customs Union has created 
very disparate effects for its two partners.62 The free movement of 
workers and services provisions incorporated in the Ankara 
Association Agreement and its Protocol have been interpreted by the 
ECJ in a way that created generous distributive effects for Turkish 
workers in the European Union.63 Once Turks leave their home state 
 
 58. See EurActiv.com, EU-Turkey Relations, http://www.euractiv.com/en/ 
enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) 
(positing that the even though the “underlying and shared objective” of Turkey’s 
negotiating talks is accession, the ultimate outcome of accession is not 
guaranteed). 
 59.  For instance, since the creation of the Customs Union, it reached 75 billion 
Euros in 2005. See Council of the European Union, Association with Turkey – 
Establishment of the Position of the European Union for the 45th Association 
Council Meeting (Luxembourg, 12 June 2006), at 31, available at 
http://www.tobb.org.tr/abm/mevzuatvedokumanlar/st10324_en06.doc (observing 
some “unfulfilled commitments” by Turkey that hamper the success of the E.U.-
Turkey Customs Union). 
 60. See European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations: Turkey, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/turkey/index_en.htm (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2009). 
 61. Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 3, at 5. 
 62. Some scholars have shown that this customs regime has been more 
beneficial to the EU than to Turkey. See CHRIS RUMFORD, EUROPEAN COHESION? 
CONTRADICTIONS IN EU INTEGRATION 94, 105-06 (2000) (explaining that the pre-
single market phase tends to “promote concentrations of development in the 
already prosperous areas of the EU” and “exacerbate divergent standards of 
living”). 
 63. See Edgar Lenski, Turkey and the EU: On the Road to Nowhere?, 63 
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 77, 84-85 (2003) (summarizing developments following 
the implementation of the Ankara Agreement’s free movement of workers 
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and become labor migrants in Europe, the Member States cannot 
discriminate against them and therefore exclude them from the same 
employment and other social security benefits granted to their own 
nationals. In this respect, Turkish migrant workers have won a 
number of salient legal battles on European soil. Since the 1990s the 
ECJ has recognized a number of individual rights for Turkish 
migrants derived directly from the provisions of the Ankara 
Association Agreement, its Protocol, and the decisions of the 
Council of Association.64 Thus, the status of Turkish migrants today 
is more privileged than that of any other third country national in the 
European Union. The Ankara Agreement has played a significant 
role in favoring the integration of Turkish workers and their families 
through easier access to residency permits and other employment 
benefits in Europe. 
By contrast, the European Union sets up cross-border projects and 
pre-accession redistributive schemes to support the economies of 
non-member countries. While Turkey has been a member of the 
Customs Union since 1996, it has never had access to such pre-
accession financial aid or other forms of cooperation projects.65 
While other countries entering customs unions with the EU benefited 
from the European Community cohesion policy strategies, Turkey 
did not.66 Cohesion policies consist of financial support that is 
allocated to prepare the new members to cope with the pressures of 
the European competitive trade regime, high volume of imports, and 
market deregulation. In this respect, Chris Rumford highlighted that 
the attitude of the European Union toward Turkey has been highly 
contradictory: 
Turkey, via the Customs Union, has been accepted as an 
economic partner in the single market, but at the same time is 
excluded from the range of projects that are designed to 
underpin the common market . . . . Expanding the common
 
provisions). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 93 (maintaining that “Turkey is excluded 
from almost all the EU projects that are designed to facilitate the economic 
integration of non-member countries”). 
 66. See id. (“The funds allocated to pre-accession are dwarfed by the Cohesion 
Fund payments to existing members.”). 
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market does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with enlarging 
the [European Union].67 
When compared to the aid that the Eastern European countries 
received prior to the 2004 enlargement, Turkey has borne most of the 
costs rather than shared in the benefits of European economic 
integration by never entering the pre-accession category.68 As 
Rumford emphasizes: 
The most striking feature of the cross-border initiatives . . . is 
the systematic exclusion of Turkey from almost all of  
them. . . . The exclusion of Turkey is more significant 
following the introduction of the Customs Union which 
underpins Turkey’s economic bond with the EU, and which 
confers upon Turkey a degree of economic integration 
matched by no other non-member country.69 
Lately, however, this much criticized disparate regime has come to 
an end. In 2007 the European Commission approved its new strategy 
of E.U. financial assistance for the period 2007-2009 through the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance.70 During this period 
Turkey, together with other countries seeking accession, would 
receive funding from the European Union to promote democratic and 
economic development on its path to E.U. membership. According to 
the Commission, Turkey should receive about 1.602 billion Euros 
from Brussels through a two-year program geared to strengthen 
market and political institutions.71 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 107-08 (explaining that “pre-accession is a far more flexible and 
beneficial stage of membership” because pre-accession countries “have a clear 
perspective of membership” and “pre-accession includes participation in a wide 
range of EU initiatives . . . which assist with preparations for full membership”). 
 69. Id. at 106. 
 70. Commission Decision on a Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document 
(MIPD) 2007-2009 for Turkey, C (2007) 1835 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_turkey_2007_2009_en.pdf. 
 71. See id. at 16 (allocating the total assistance for institution building, cross-
border cooperation, regional and rural development, and human resources 
development); see also Press Release, European Comm’n, European Commission 
Completes Multi-Annual Planning of Financial Assistance to the Candidate and 
Potential Candidate Countries (June 20, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/856 (pointing out that the EU’s 
assistance to Turkey focuses on building strong institutions that will foster respect 
for human rights and the rule of law). For instance, in 2008 the Commission 
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C. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AND SOCIAL BACKLASH 
The relationship between Turkey and Western Europe can be 
traced back at least to the Ottoman Empire. This long relationship 
shows how the legal arena is an important ground for furthering 
cooperation and channeling deep cultural and political struggles. In 
the late nineteenth century, Turkey became a borrower of legal 
models from Europe.72 The transplant of legal regimes, and in 
particular of civil codes, was a welcome activity performed by legal 
elites, having a clear modernizing agenda initially for the Ottoman 
Empire and later for the Turkish Republic under Atatürk.73 Legal 
elites borrowing European codes and legislative models aimed to 
place their country in conversation with Western jurists in Germany 
and France. At the same time, however, they sought to retain their 
own cultural and political autonomy from Western legal influences 
in areas that were not connected to the market. For example, in the 
realm of family law, comparative lawyers have shown how the legal 
transplant of the Swiss civil code to modernize Turkish family law in 
the 1920s created legal mismatches.74 
 
adopted for the period 2008-2010 an Instrument for Pre-Accession for Turkey that 
will provide approximately 540 million Euros in financial assistance. Turkey 2008 
Progress Report, supra note 3, at 5. 
 72. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 109-10 (2d 
ed. 1968) (explaining that the early Turkish commercial code was based almost 
entirely on French law); see also NIYAZI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SECULARISM IN TURKEY 160-69 (1964) (observing that Turkey’s commercial 
relations with outsiders necessitated the adoption of a commercial code). 
 73. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW 98 (2d ed. 1993) (suggesting that even fixed areas of Turkish 
private law, such as family law, were modernized as a result of foreign influence); 
Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 451 (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (recognizing the modernization of the Turkish 
law as a conscious choice made by the government despite resistance from the 
majority of the population); see generally Pier Giuseppe Monateri, The ‘Weak 
Law’: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES, Issue 3 – 
2001, art. 5, at 21, available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol1/iss3/art5 
(providing an overview of transplants and suggesting that “the practice of 
borrowings has always been a normal practice”), Duncan Kennedy, The 
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (suggesting that 
the practice of borrowings in the first globalization operated differently with 
respect to the market or the family). 
 74. See Ruth A. Miller, The Ottoman and Islamic Substratum of Turkey’s Swiss 
Civil Code, 11 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 335, 335-36 (2000) (attributing the success of the 
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The most recent example of legal transplant in Turkey results from 
the pressure that Brussels places on Turkish legal and political elites 
to adopt the acquis communautaire to harmonize Turkish law with 
E.U. standards.75 Unlike the nineteenth century, today Turkish legal 
elites are under pressure from supranational actors; Brussels and 
Strasbourg have played a major role in the Turkish government’s 
adoption of E.U. law and respect of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). Despite their Herculean harmonization 
efforts, Turkish politicians and lawyers have received contradictory 
signals from Brussels, the E.U. Courts in Luxembourg, and the 
ECtHR in Strasbourg.76 On one hand, the denial of E.U. membership 
has frustrated the efforts of the Turkish legal elites who have been 
struggling to adopt directives harmonizing their market to E.U. legal 
standards; on the other hand, the ECHR has upheld several Turkish 
policies, such as the ban on headscarves in Universities, that appear 
incompatible with the country’s effort to democratize.77 In this 
respect, Brussels seems to espouse the analysis of Samuel 
Issacharoff, who defined Turkey as a “fragile” democracy.78 Even 
though the Turkish government successfully shattered and dissolved 
the elected Islamic Welfare Party, the ECtHR legitimized this
 
Swiss Code in Turkey to a loose translation of its contents, which allowed for a 
better fit between the Code and the society to which it was applied); Esin Örücü, 
Turkey: Reconciling Traditional Society and Secular Demands, 26 J. FAM. L. 221, 
233-35 (1987-88) (suggesting further upgrades to the Turkish family law but 
recognizing that the Turkish courts have modernized the Civil Code through liberal 
interpretation). 
 75. See European Commission – Enlargement, How Does a Country Join the 
EU?, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how 
_does_a_country_join_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2009) (demonstrating that in order for Turkey to join the EU, it 
needs to prove, among other things, its ability to “effectively apply and implement 
the acquis,” and explaining the content of the aquis communautaire). 
 76. See Yeğinsü, supra note 37, at 18-25 (exploring the contradictory messages 
that the Commission in Brussels and the ECHR in Strasbourg have been sending to 
Turkey regarding human rights standards). 
 77. See Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 109, ¶¶ 165-66 
(2005) (upholding a ban on Islamic headscarves at Istanbul University because it 
was instituted “to preserve the secular nature of educational institutions”). 
 78. See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 
1444-47 (2007) (reflecting on the decision of Turkey’s Constitutional Court 
dissolving the Welfare party for its anti-secular position). 
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behavior that would otherwise be considered dangerous for any other 
Western democratic regime.79 
The human rights saga is only part of what has triggered a major 
backlash among the Turkish elites, who have expressed soaring 
frustration with accession to the European Union. While accession 
requires an enormous effort to incorporate the acquis 
communautaire, the Turkish political and legal elites who undertook 
this effort received little recognition.80 As commentators put it, 
despite this long and burdensome process, Turkey is the “longest-
standing applicant to join the Community . . . [and] it is the longest-
standing of those who remain frustrated.”81 
Generally, the narrative of enlargement often has been presented 
as the path for accession countries to seek membership in the 
exclusive club of Western democracies.82 Thus, there is an exclusive 
benefit for new members rather than for the European Union. Many 
commentators, however, have portrayed an alternative narrative of 
accession. They have highlighted gains not only for the new 
members, but in particular for the Union in requiring unilateral 
economic and political reforms without committing to grant 
membership. In writing about the Eastern European enlargement, 
scholars have noted the gains for the European Union and its long-
term members: “They have gained industrial free trade without 
making a commitment to grant membership. Unless membership 
comes quickly, there will be a significant negative symmetry for 
most of the less developed associate countries after 2001.”83 Despite 
the implicit gains of expanding its markets and its political and 
security borders, the European Union nevertheless can dictate 
unilaterally the rules of accession. Thus, “at the time when the 
 
 79. See Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 269, 
¶ 135 (2003) (justifying the dissolution of the Welfare Party as arising out of 
“pressing social need”). 
 80. Ian Ward, The Culture of Enlargement, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 212-22 
(2005-06) (underscoring the EU’s distrust towards Turkey’s progress and 
describing Turkish politicians’ frustration with the EU). 
 81. Id. at 208. 
 82. See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 376-78 (suggesting that accession to the EU 
has become an “all or nothing proposition,” under which partial assimilation with 
the EU is insufficient). 
 83. ANDRÁS INOTAI, What is Novel About Eastern Enlargement of the 
European Union?, in ON THE WAY: HUNGARY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 11, 17-
18 (1998). 
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[Central and Eastern European countries] were coping with the task 
of satisfying a set of Copenhagen accession criteria and had opened 
their economies to [E.U.] businesses, there was no formal obligation 
from the European Union side to accept new members . . . .”84 In 
other words, these scholars clarified that enlargement was not only 
beneficial for candidate countries, but was also highly beneficial to 
the European Union.85 
Critical narratives about E.U. enlargement, underlining the 
benefits that the Union gains from its new members, have been 
largely overlooked by scholarship and the public opinion. In fact, 
mainstream narratives have highlighted the gains for the new 
members and the generosity of the European Union towards them. 
These mainstream narratives helped to legitimize the asymmetrical 
power between the Union and its aspiring members during the 
accession negotiation. Thus, the European Union can freely set the 
conditions for accession while not committing to grant membership 
to those countries that already undertook the path towards full 
membership by transplanting and harmonizing legal regimes and 
committing to trade as well as political obligations. 
II. YEDAŞ TARIM AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: 
THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. RELIANCE ON THE ANKARA ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
In Yedaş Tarim, a Turkish company manufacturing ball bearings 
and importing spare parts for agricultural and automotive industry 
sued the EC for damages resulting from the manner in which the 
Customs Union was implemented between the EC and Turkey from 
1996 to 2003.86 In particular, the lifting of customs duties, which 
increased imports in Turkey, created a negative impact on Yedaş 
 
 84. GAĻINA ŽUKOVA, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE IN GOODS BETWEEN THE EU 
AND ITS CANDIDATE STATES: THE CASE OF LATVIA 21 (2004). 
 85. Id. at 23 (explaining that enlargement “is very much about EU gains, a fact 
which is very often forgotten in the western perception of the accession of 
[E]astern Europe countries to the EU”). 
 86. Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council 
of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 20. 
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Tarim’s commercial activities.87 In pursuing compensation through 
damages under Article 288 EC, the plaintiff complained that the 
Community never gave the financial support promised in the Ankara 
Association Agreement, and it failed to comply with its obligations 
towards Turkey.88 With respect to the causal link between the loss 
suffered and the unlawful conduct of the EC, the applicant claimed 
that the Customs Union had a negative effect on the Turkish 
economy as a whole and that while its production suffered losses, its 
imports were also damaged by the intense competition of cheap 
quality goods entering the Customs Union from the Far East.89 
The Court of First Instance rejected Yedaş Tarim’s claim by 
holding that the case did not present unlawful conduct of the EC 
since “the case-law requires that there must be established a 
sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights 
on individuals.”90 With regard to the provisions of the Ankara 
Agreement, the CFI held, by referring to Demirel, that those 
provisions were to be considered as “programmatic in nature.” 
Consequently, the Court ruled out that such provisions would have 
direct effect on the appellant’s situation.91 As to the Financial 
Protocol, the Court held that the applicant did not state what 
provisions conferred an individual right on Yedaş Tarim.92 Further, 
the Court found no EC declarations with a promise to grant 2.5 
billion Euros to Turkey when entering the Customs Union.93 The CFI 
held that only the Preamble of the 1970 Additional Protocol provided 
that “mutual and balanced obligations” should be undertaken by both 
parties.94 This, according to the Court, was only a programmatic 
obligation from which direct effect could not be derived.95 
 
 87. Id. ¶ 24. 
 88. Id. ¶ 22. 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. 
 90. Id. ¶ 35 (citing, among others, the well-known state liability case, Joined 
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland). 
 91. See id. ¶¶ 39-42 (concluding that because the Ankara agreement did not 
provide detailed rules for carrying out its goals but was later supplemented by the 
Additional Protocol, it did not have direct effect on the applicant). 
 92. Id. ¶ 45. 
 93. Id. ¶ 46. 
 94. Id. ¶ 49 (finding preamble language does not create legal obligations). 
 95. Id. ¶¶ 42, 49 (arguing, essentially, that the agreement is not sufficiently 
precise and unconditional and, therefore, does not confer rights on individuals). 
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The CFI textualist interpretation is surprising when compared to 
the generous interpretation of the ECJ in establishing the direct 
applicability of the decisions of the Council of Association in the 
case of the free movement of Turkish migrants in the European 
Union.96 Similar to its free movement decisions addressing Turkish 
workers, the CFI could have adopted in this case a teleological 
interpretation supporting the applicant’s claims.97 Rather than 
focusing on the text of the agreement, a teleological interpretation 
requires an evaluation of the goals of the ongoing relationship 
between the EC and Turkey beginning at the time of the Ankara 
Agreement. In establishing the unlawfulness of the conduct of the 
Community, the Court could evaluate the meaning of unlawfulness 
in the context of the European Union’s ongoing promises to Turkey. 
The contractual relationship between the parties, who entered into 
several international treaties by means of the Ankara Agreement and 
its protocols, also created a reliance interest in Turkey insofar as both 
parties committed, through long negotiations, international 
agreements, and diplomatic relations, to “promote the continuous and 
balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the 
Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated 
development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of 
employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people.”98 
In international law the doctrine of estoppel has been adopted, not 
without difficulties, in cases in which the behavior of Country A has 
led Country B to believe that it would engage in a certain action, and 
therefore Country B relied on a future action.99 In a well-known case, 
 
 96. See Bulent Cicekli, Legal Integration of Turkish Immigrants under the 
Turkish-EU Association Law, TURKISH WKLY, http://www.turkishweekly.net/ 
article/22/legal-integration-of-turkish-immigrants-under-the-turkish-eu-association 
-law.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) (arguing the Court’s approach evidences an 
attempt to realistically balance migrant worker’s expectations and Member States’ 
national interests in immigration). 
 97. See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van 
Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 1 
(propounding that in order to determine whether treaty provisions have direct 
effect, courts must consider not only the wording, but also the spirit and the 
general scheme of the treaty). 
 98. Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2(1). 
 99. See JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 93-
94 (1996) (explaining that the doctrine of estoppel is usually “applied in situations 
of law-application rather than law making”); I. C. MacGibbon, Estoppel In 
International Law, 7 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 468, 512-13 (1958) (acknowledging that 
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adopted the doctrine of 
estoppel by holding that, due to Thailand’s behavior, Cambodia was 
led to believe that it had accepted a particular territorial 
delimitation.100 When Thailand tried to challenge this territorial 
delimitation, which included land of great religious salience for both 
countries on the Cambodian side of the border, the ICJ held that 
Thailand’s conduct had induced Cambodia to rely on it by accepting 
the new delimitation.101 In another well-known ICJ case, Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co., Belgium sued Spain, seeking 
reparation for damages caused to its nationals who were shareholders 
of Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company and who were 
damaged by the Spanish government’s actions towards the 
company’s operations in Spain.102 After Belgium’s initial suit against 
Spain, the parties entered into negotiations, and Belgium withdrew 
its suit. When negotiations failed, Belgium tried to re-file the suit, 
and Spain claimed that it was estopped from bringing the suit again 
because Spain had relied on Belgium’s agreement to negotiate. The 
ICJ rejected the notion that Spain had suffered some detriment 
because, without Spain’s agreement to negotiate, the initial lawsuit 
would have proceeded, and thus it found no estoppel.103 The ICJ 
constructed the notion of estoppel narrowly by requiring a showing 
of how Belgium induced Spain to act or to refrain from acting and a 
showing of detriment suffered by Spain in relying upon Belgium’s 
representations.104 
 
some aspects of estoppel are in the process of becoming an international customary 
norm). 
 100. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 33 (June 
15). 
 101. See id. at 32-33 (deciding that Thailand had received and accepted the 
territorial delimitation as evidenced by the country’s conduct); see also KLABBERS, 
supra note 99, at 93-94 (using Temple of Preah Vihear to illustrate the application 
of estoppel and to caution that “states may end up being estopped from acting 
contrary to a non-legally binding agreement they concluded”) . 
 102. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 I.C.J. 6, 
9 (July 24). 
 103. See id. at 24-25 (determining that Spain’s use of an estoppel argument to 
attempt to preclude Belgium from re-bringing a claim that had been subject to a 
discontinuance and failed negotiations did not show sufficient reliance or detriment 
on Spain’s part to constitute an estoppel defense). 
 104. Christopher Brown, A Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel in 
International Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 395-97 (1996) (discussing the 
estoppel test applied by the Court and identifying it as a narrower version of 
estoppel). See also Alfred J. Rubin, The International Legal Effects of Unilateral 
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As the doctrine of the ICJ demonstrates, the doctrine of estoppel in 
international law is far from being clear and uncontroversial. Several 
commentators have traced its legitimacy back to its initial 
development in English equity courts and its subsequent 
Americanization with the American Law Institute’s adoption of the 
famous Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. Section 90 aimed 
to fill the contractual gaps by expanding the range of binding 
contracts through promissory estoppel.105 While establishing the 
existence of the notion of estoppel in international law might not be 
hard, scholars have often challenged its application as being a “wild 
card” because, absent its common law restraints, estoppel could 
allow “one who plays it in international law to make it represent any 
legal notion he desires.”106 
The fear of judicial manipulation of the doctine of estoppel seems 
familiar in the European Union context. In Yedaş Tarim the E.U. 
courts did not attempt to explore broad or narrow interpretations of 
the estoppel doctrine; rather, the CFI remained completely deaf to 
the claims made by the applicant. For instance, “the fact that the 
entry into force of the Customs Union coincided approximately with 
the reduction in the applicant’s profits [was not] sufficient to 
establish a direct link between the facts complained of and the 
damage alleged.”107 The Court implied that to satisfy the causal link 
between the damages and the unlawful action of the EC, the 
applicant could have prepared a more thorough economic assessment 
to quantify the losses and to show that the costs of the Customs 
Union outweighed the benefits that Turkey never received in the 
 
Declaration, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 16-17 (1977) (observing that the doctrine of 
international estoppel was preceded by “estoppel” in Anglo-American law, and by 
“‘preclusion’ or ‘forclusion’” in the civil law of Continental Europe). 
 105. See SPENCER BOWER, THE LAW RELATING TO ESTOPPEL BY 
REPRESENTATION 514-16 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that the American 
interpretation of promissory estoppel, which first suggested that the theory could 
be an independent source of obligations, is applied by American courts in such as 
way that it did not lead to an expansion of the doctrine as many traditionalists had 
feared); see generally 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.11 
(Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1996) (providing an overview of the historical development 
of promissory estoppel and noting that the doctrine was developed over five 
centuries). 
 106. Brown, supra note 104, at 385. 
 107. Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council 
of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 59. 
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form of financial aid.108 In its holding, the CFI turned one of the 
conditions to assess the non-contractual liability into a sophisticated 
economic quantification. However, without a particular 
macroeconomic expertise, common law judges have been 
quantifying the amount of the reliance interest by putting the plaintiff 
in the position he was before entering into the contract, rather than 
letting the plaintiff bear the costs of a “bad bargain.”109 
In 1993, Yedaş Tarim started his investment in Turkey in reliance 
on the fact that by entering into a Customs Union with the European 
Union, Turkey would also be entitled to receive the benefits tied to 
the future accession.110 Rather than investing in a Turkish business 
for European exports, Yedaş Tarim could have targeted different 
markets, differentiated its production, and developed more diverse 
geographic ambitions. While the CFI addressed some of these 
motives, either through an interpretation of the basis for creating 
liability for the EC or by putting aside difficult quantifications, the 
ECJ failed to reexamine Yedaş Tarim’s motives in the appeal. The 
ECJ affirmed the decision of the CFI and dismissed the appeal by 
finding most of the grounds of the appeal either manifestly 
unfounded or inadmissible.111 
 
 108. Id. ¶¶ 58-59 (reasoning that an intervening factor could have instead caused 
the loss of profits, “such as the structure of the Turkish market, the adaptation of 
Yedaş Tarim’s competitors to the different markets in question, fluctuations of the 
national currency and the conclusion of other trade agreements by Turkey”). 
 109. See Marc Owen, Some Aspects of the Recovery of Reliance Damages in the 
Law of Contract, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 394-95 (1984) (noting that the 
reliance damage approach, i.e., putting the plaintiff in the position he would have 
been in had the contract been fully performed, is the conservative approach 
towards damages). 
 110. See Yedas Tarim, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 24 (detailing the company’s 
investment decision “to invest in the production of ball bearings because domestic 
production was . . . protected by a particular customs tariff”); see also RUMFORD, 
supra note 63, at 93-94 (observing that while Turkey has been included in the 
common market through the Customs Union, it has been “excluded from the range 
of projects that are designed to underpin the common market”). 
 111. See Case C-255/06 P, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. 
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B. UNFULFILLED PROMISES: THE DETRIMENT FOR YEDAŞ TARIM 
Having established the possibility of enforcing the promises made 
by the European Union to Turkey through the doctrine of estoppel, 
especially by assessing their ongoing relationship, this Part focuses 
on two different sets of implications deriving from the promises 
made to Turkey and never fulfilled by Brussels. A first set of 
promises concerns the implicit benefits of a Customs Union between 
Turkey and the European Union in light of the future Turkish 
accession within a reasonable time. The second set of promises 
concerns the financial aid package as well as other pre-accession 
types of aid promised by Brussels to facilitate Turkey’s restructuring 
its economy in light of its future E.U. membership. This Part 
demonstrates that in relying on the promises made by the European 
Union, there have been different kinds of detriments for Turkey. 
The first set of promises made by Brussels concerns the Customs 
Union that was created by Article 10 of the Ankara Agreement in 
1963. In 1970 the Additional Protocol set the conditions to establish 
a Customs Union and the transitional periods for its 
implementation.112 In 1995 with Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council the Customs Union entered the final phase of its 
implementation requiring the abolition by both parties of import and 
export customs duties.113 In this context, the European Union 
promised that the Customs Union would strengthen the trade 
relationship between the two entities.114 While the Customs Union 
was implemented by Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association 
Council, its timetable extended until 2001. In Yedaş Tarim, the 
claimant argued that Turkey suffered a number of financial losses 
with the Customs Union’s entry into force. Because all the customs 
duties were eliminated, the Turkish industry could not compete with 
 
 112. See Additional Protocol, supra note 15, art. 1. 
 113. EC-Turkey Association Council Decision 1/95, 1996 O.J. (L 35) 1, art. 4 
[hereinafter Decision 1/95] (requiring also that both countries refrain from 
imposing new tariffs). 
 114. See Nannette A.E.M. Neuwahl, The EU-Turkey Customs Union: A 
Balance, but No Equilibrium, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 37, 37-38 (1999) (stating 
that EC-Turkey Association Council Decision 1/95 reaffirmed the significance of 
the Ankara Agreement, “which provides for the accession of Turkey to the 
European Community ‘as soon as the operation of the Agreement has advanced far 
enough to justify full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations [entailed in 
membership]’”). 
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European products, and this resulted in huge losses for the Turkish 
manufacturers. Likewise, Yedaş Tarim suffered large financial losses 
at the time of the implementation of the Customs Union.115 Another 
detriment for Turkey, rather than a benefit as promised by Brussels, 
was the elimination of customs taxes so that Turkey had to increase 
its value-added tax (VAT) rates to balance its budget. As a result, 
Turkish citizens had to pay higher taxes, while the prices of goods 
were increasing as a result of a less competitive economy when 
compared to other E.U. Member States.116 
In 1963, the Ankara Agreement was a compromise that the EEC 
reached at the time in response to Turkey’s demand to become a 
member of the EC.117 The Agreement consisted of a preliminary step 
for accession, provided that Turkey met the democratic and 
economic conditions of EU membership.118 Moreover, the Ankara 
Agreement created a Customs Union which was not fully operative 
until 1996 and even after then Turkish agricultural products were still 
excluded from the Customs Union and limited by E.U. quotas.119 
Despite such exclusion, for over twenty years Turkey has 
restructured its agricultural policy to harmonize its standards with 
those of the EC because “the Community promised to take into 
account Turkish agricultural interests and speed of development in 
this sector while adopting its own rules in this field.”120 However, 
 
 115. See Yedas Tarim, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 23 (describing the applicant’s 
claim that the Customs Union adversely affected the Turkish economy as a whole). 
 116. See Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford & David G. Tarr, Economic 
Implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union 3 (The 
World Bank Int’l Econ. Dept., Working Paper No. 1599, 1996) (estimating 
Turkey’s revenue loss from implementing the Customs Union at 1.4% of GDP and 
forecasting that if Turkey decides to use the VAT to replace the lost revenues, then 
“VAT rates will have to increase by 16.2% in each sector to compensate for the 
revenue loss”). 
 117. See ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 38 (explaining that the objective of the 
Ankara Agreement was to create an Association between the Parties that would 
ultimately facilitate Turkish accession to the EC) . 
 118. See Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 28 (“As soon as the operation of 
this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by 
Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the 
Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the 
Community.”). 
 119. RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 92-93 (noting that while agriculture is 
excluded from the range of sectors included in the Customs Union, a 1998 farm 
agreement has reduced the quotas for Turkish farm products). 
 120. ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 43. 
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such promise was never fulfilled. Because of the failed Turkish 
accession, agricultural products remained excluded from the 
Customs Union, while Turkey had to cope with restructuring its 
agricultural sector according to E.U. standards.121 
In Yedaş Tarim, the damage that the applicant alleged is the 
current “macroeconomic imbalance” created by the inadequate aid 
that the EC gave to Turkey in the context of the Customs Union.122 
During the first year of the Customs Union, Turkey’s imports from 
the European Union increased significantly.123 However, this was not 
the case for the Turkish exports to Europe, which did not increase as 
expected but varied sector by sector.124 In 1996 the Commission 
recognized such imbalance in imports and exports with Turkey, and 
it noticed that its exports had doubled especially in the textile sector 
where Turkey was losing its comparative advantage.125 Thus, the 
Customs Union was a model of pre-accession integration that did not 
prove very successful and that the European Union did not follow in 
its subsequent negotiations. In this respect, Galina Žukova explains 
that “once the Community has burnt its fingers by promising more 
than it is actually willing to offer in practical terms, it does not make 
the same mistake again.”126 
The second detriment for Turkey stems from the promises made in 
relation to the Financial Protocols to the Agreement. In Yedaş Tarim, 
the ECJ found that the EC’s unilateral undertaking to grant Turkey 
 
 121. See RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 92-93 (noting that “not all sectors of the 
Turkish economy are included in the Customs Union,” including agriculture, and 
explaining that a 1998 farm agreement between the EU and Turkey does not 
“amount to an extension of the single market” because processed agricultural 
goods are still excluded). 
 122. See Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. 
Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 20 (summarizing the 
applicant’s arguments). 
 123. RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 95 (reporting that “European Union exports to 
Turkey increased from $15.8 billion in 1995 to $24 billion in 1997”). 
 124. See id. (showing a modest increase in Turkey’s exports to the EU); 
ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 42 (comparing the growth of exports from Turkey to 
the EU (4%) to the imports to Turkey from the EU (32.5%) during the first year); 
see also Neuwahl, supra note 114, at 45-46 (attributing Turkey’s slower export 
growth to the fact that most of Turkey’s exports were industrial or manufactured 
goods, which have been exported to the EU without a customs tariff since 1971). 
 125. See ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 42 (reporting that the Commission took 
notice that Turkey’s imports of clothing from the EU increased by 130% in 1996). 
 126. See id. at 44. 
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financial help did not enter into force due to the veto of Greece in the 
context of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.127 The financial 
package was supposed to support Turkey in addressing the possible 
detriment created by the Customs Union. The aim of the financial 
package was to enable the Turkish government to offer short-term 
financial aid to those sectors such as the textile industry that had 
suffered from the trade liberalization created by the Customs 
Union.128 When the applicant in Yedaş Tarim argued that the 
Commission and the EC defaulted on their promises because they did 
not take necessary steps to adopt the financial aid package, the Court 
responded succinctly that the European Union was not accountable 
for these actions.129 Rather, the applicant was not able to prove which 
specific provisions of the financial protocols had been infringed. 
Further, the CFI found that the provision of “reciprocal and balanced 
obligations” between the parties was a vague commitment that did 
not have direct effect, and in turn, it could not create liability for the 
European Community.130 
The Ankara Agreement set in place some financial aid to promote 
economic and democratic developments in Turkey, but this was 
consistently blocked by Greece until 1999 when the Commission 
finally proposed a smaller package of aid.131 The Commission 
adopted this modest package of financial aid because it classified 
Turkey as a developing country, which did not require a unanimous 
vote but rather a qualified majority in the Council, thus enabling the 
 
 127. See Case C-255/06 P, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. 




the applicant’s allegations concerning Turkey’s deficit). 
 128. See Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3(1) (stating that “[d]uring the 
preparatory stage Turkey shall, with aid from the Community, strengthen its 
economy so as to enable it to fulfil [sic] the obligations which will devolve upon it 
during the transitional and final stages”). 
 129. Case T-367/03, Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council 
of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-873, ¶ 50. 
 130. See id. ¶¶ 42-49 (finding that provisions relied upon by the applicant were 
insufficiently precise or unconditional to have direct effect in the applicant’s 
situation). 
 131. Cf. Hugg, supra note 2, at 1326-28 (attributing improved relations between 
Greece and Turkey to, among other things, the election of more moderate foreign 
ministers in each country). 
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Commission to circumvent the Greek veto.132 These facts support the 
notion that in the long negotiation with the EU, Turkey relied on 
receiving some benefits from a future accession to the EU that it did 
not enjoy fully or timely. 
III. THE CURRENT TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
CREATED BY THE ANKARA ASSOCIATION 
AGREEMENT AND ITS SUBSEQUENT PROTOCOL 
This Part moves beyond the debate on the likelihood of Turkish 
accession to the European Union, and instead focuses on the 
significant economic and political consequences for Turkey 
stemming from the Ankara Agreement. There is a steep imbalance in 
the consequences of the free movement doctrines as interpreted by 
the ECJ and in the alignment of Turkish commercial policy with that 
of the European Union. Over time, the promise of Turkish accession 
to the European Union has burdened Turkey much more than 
Brussels, and has led to Ankara’s receiving fewer benefits than 
anticipated. 
A. REASSESSING THE UNBALANCED TURKEY-EUROPEAN UNION 
TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
With the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement in 1963 
and the Additional Protocol in 1970, the European Community 
created a large number of obligations for Turkey and rights for its 
citizens with respect to the free movement of workers and services 
and the freedom of establishment in the European Union.133 Over the 
years, the ECJ has changed its jurisprudence in interpreting the right 
 
 132. See RUMFORD, supra note 63, at 95 (underscoring the importance of the aid 
package to Turkey because it showed the EU would honor its Customs Union 
commitments). 
 133. See Ankara Agreement, supra note 8; Additional Protocol, supra note 15. 
Article 13 of the Association Agreement contains the following general provision 
on the freedom of establishment between the Member States and Turkey: “The 
Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of the 
Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on 
freedom of establishment between them.” Article 41 of the Additional Protocol 
provides as follows: “The Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing 
between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services.” 
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of free movement and the right of establishment of Turkish migrant 
workers and their families.134 In interpreting the Ankara Association 
Agreement, the ECJ has strengthened those free movement rights for 
Turkish nationals that are directly enforceable in European domestic 
courts.135  
Because of the Association Agreement, Turkish migrants benefit 
from a different status in the European Union, especially when 
compared to other third country nationals, with respect to work 
permits, visa requirements and social security entitlements.136 Even 
though the freedom of movement of workers and services and the 
freedom of establishment are not yet unconditional rights for Turkish 
nationals, they are entitled to benefit from whatever progress is made 
towards the elimination of restrictions on these rights.137 However, 
the favorable treatment of Turkish workers and their families has 
triggered important distributive effects for E.U. Member States. In 
fact, national welfare regimes are now under pressure, not only due 
to the competition created by the internal market, but also because of 
the extension of social benefits to Turkish immigrants, who have 
been performing an increasingly significant share of low-skill jobs.138 
The favorable treatment of Turkish migrants by the ECJ creates a 
burden which impacts mostly the domestic social security schemes 
of the Member States, rather than the almost non-existent E.U. social 
policy.139 
 
 134. See Lenski, supra note 65, at 84-85 (noting deficiencies in the EU law on 
the freedom of movement of Turkish workers and crediting the ECJ with 
developing case law on the subject matter). 
 135. See id. (explaining the ECJ’s decisions that found that the Association 
Council’s decisions implementing the Ankara Agreement conferred the free 
movement rights to Turkish workers). 
 136. See Cicekli, supra note 96 (characterizing the EU’s general approach to the 
issue of third country nationals’ treatment as host-nation centered and attributing 
Turkish immigrants’ more favorable status to the Ankara Agreement). 
 137. See id. (noting that the right of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services are not unconditional rights but acknowledging that the intra-European 
freedom of movement has not yet been expanded to include third country 
nationals). See generally CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE 
EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS (2007). 
 138. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the 
Challenges of Diversity, in INTEGRATION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION: 
REASSESSING THE FUNDAMENTALS 109, 112-15 (J. H. H. Weiler, Iain Begg & John 
Peterson eds., 2003) (explaining the competitive pressure that the EU places on the 
domestic welfare regimes of the Member States). 
 139.  See JEAN-CLAUDE BARBIER, LA LONGUE MARCHE VERS L'EUROPE SOCIALE 
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With respect with the world trade effects of the Ankara 
Agreement, this created a number of obligations for the Turkish 
Republic because it required the country seeking E.U. membership to 
gradually align itself to the European common commercial policy.140 
This obligation has created numerous consequences for global trade, 
in particular with respect to Turkey’s position in the WTO. Because 
of Turkey’s restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products, 
India has challenged the Turkish regulations as an infringement of 
the WTO obligation.141 At the same time, complying with such 
restrictions is an important obligation of the Turkey-European Union 
Customs Union.142 Thus, the Ankara Agreement puts Turkey in a 
double bind situation whereby in aligning itself with the E.U. 
common commercial policy it violates the multilateral trade 
obligations of the WTO, thus opening itself up to lawsuits by third 
countries for such violations. 
B. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS AND SERVICES 
The question of whether association agreements, similar to 
international treaties signed by the EC, create an individual right that 
is directly enforceable by domestic courts has been one of the central 
jurisprudential debates in E.U. international relations.143 The ECJ 
 
DE PARIS, (PUF, coll. “Le lien social,” 2008). 
 140. Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4(1); see ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 
38-40 (stressing that the Customs Union “implies inter alia a common commercial 
policy” because Turkey is required, among other things, to harmonize its external 
trade policies with those of the Community). 
 141. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing India’s complaint 
against Turkey before the WTO). 
 142. See Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products, ¶¶ 9.141-9.149, 9.156, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter WTO 
Panel Report on Turkish Textiles] (considering Turkey’s argument that it had to 
adopt exactly the same external trade policies as that of the Customs Union, but 
ultimately concluding that Turkey had to bring its measures into conformity with 
its WTO obligations); WTO Appellate Body Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note 
7, ¶¶ 63-64 (upholding the Panel’s decision that Turkey needed to bring its trade 
measures into conformity with their obligations under the WTO agreements). 
 143. See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 207 (4th ed. 2008) (remarking on the proliferation of academic 
literature on the legal effects of international agreements in the EC legal order); see 
also Gerhard Bebr, Agreements Concluded by the Community and Their Possible 
Direct Effect: From International Fruit Company to Kupferberg, 20 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 35, 65-73 (1983) (addressing the potential implications of using the 
direct effect rule, which allows European Community citizens to seek court 
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was called upon to interpret the text of the Ankara Agreement and its 
Additional Protocol to decide whether the right of free movement 
conferred to Turkish workers, legally employed in the EC was 
directly applicable.144 In Demirel the ECJ held that the Additional 
Protocol and the Ankara Association Agreement, despite their 
international nature, have become integral parts of the E.U. legal 
system.145 The Court has referred to Article 12 of the Agreement that 
expressly states that: “Contracting Parties agree to be guided by 
Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community for 
the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for 
workers between them.”146 Article 36 of the Additional Protocol 
guarantees: “Freedom of movement for workers between Member 
States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive 
stages . . . .”147 With these two provisions, Turkey and the EC were 
clearly committed towards the progressive elimination of the 
obstacles to free movement of goods, workers and services in their 
commercial relationship. The various steps in the implementation of 
such a commitment were to be taken through the decisions of the 
Association Council, the institution established by the Agreement. 
 
enforcement of European Community Treaty obligations, to interpret the effect of 
an agreement concluded by the Community with a third State); see generally Steve 
Peers, Fundamental Right or Political Whim? WTO Law and the European Court 
of Justice, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 111 
(Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001) (presenting critiques of the ECJ’s 
decisions that seemed to rule out the direct effect of WTO panel reports). 
 144. See Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, 1987 E.C.R. 3719,  
¶ 4; Cicekli, supra note 96 (articulating the ECJ’s conclusion in Demirel that 
Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol are 
programmatic and are not “sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of 
governing directly the movement of workers”). 
 145. See Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, ¶ 7 (declaring that “an agreement 
concluded by the Council under Articles 228 and 238 of the Treaty is . . . an act of 
one of the institutions of the Community . . . and, as from its entry into force, the 
provisions of such an agreement form an integral part of the Community legal 
system”). 
 146. Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, ¶ 19; Ankara Agreement, supra note 8, art. 12. 
The new numbering of the Treaty of the European Union Articles corresponds to 
the free movement of workers provisions included in articles 39, 40, and 50. 
Moreover, the Ankara Agreement includes similar provisions on the freedom of 
establishment and on the freedom to provide services in articles 13-14 of the 
Agreement. 
 147. Additional Protocol, supra note 15, art. 36 . 
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The question in Demirel was whether the provisions of the 
Agreement and the Protocol had direct effect, thus granting directly 
to Turkish citizens who were denied either working or residence 
permits under Member States’ laws the rights protected by the E.U. 
free movement provisions.148 When a provision is directly effective, 
the supremacy of E.U. law mandates that national courts apply such 
provision despite the fact that they could be in conflict with other 
domestic rules.149 However, not every provision of an international 
treaty or an association agreement stipulated by the EC is directly 
applicable, and the ECJ has created a test to determine which 
provisions have direct effect.150 This test establishes that the 
provisions of an association agreement that have direct effect must 
be clear and unconditional so that there is no need to adopt further 
measures to implement them.151 These provisions also confer rights 
to private individuals that should be directly enforceable by the 
domestic courts of the Member States.152 In Demirel, the ECJ refused 
to bestow direct effect on Article 12 of the Agreement and Article 36 
of the Protocol because both provisions were not sufficiently precise 
and unconditional to govern directly the free movement of workers 
between Turkey and the EC.153 
 
 148. See Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 2719, ¶ 14 (holding that a provision of the 
Agreement is directly applicable when, “regard being had to its wording and the 
purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and 
precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the 
adoption of any subsequent measure”). 
 149. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that 
the EU court was not obliged to apply national law that conflicted with EU law 
since EU law constitutes an “independent source of law” which cannot “be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions”); see also Case 26/62, Algemene 
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands, 1963 
E.C.R. 1 (establishing the EU’s legal principle of direct effect by ruling that 
individual citizens under certain conditions could enforce in national courts their 
Member State’s legal obligations pursuant to the state’s membership within the EU 
Community); see generally CRAIG & BÚRCA, supra note 143, at 206-07 
(summarizing the ECJ’s approach to the direct effect of international agreements). 
 150. See Algemene Transport, 1963 E.C.R. 1 (articulating the direct effect test 
as asking whether the provision creates a clear and unconditional legal obligation 
for an individual to enforce and whether the provision’s spirit and general scheme 
reveal its intention to apply to, and be enforced by, individuals in state courts). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. (finding that direct effects of a treaty create “individual rights which 
national courts must protect”). 
 153. Demirel, 1987 E.C.R. 2719, ¶ 23. 
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Three years later, the ECJ changed its opinion in a slightly 
different case interpreting a decision of the Council of Association 
rather than articles of the Agreement or the Protocol. In Sevince, the 
Court held that not only the Ankara Agreement itself but also the 
decisions of the Council of Association form integral parts of E.U. 
law.154 Mr. Sevince, a Turkish national employed for a number of 
years in the Netherlands, applied for a residence permit and was 
denied an extension of his permit.155 In support of his appeal, he cited 
the provisions contained in two decisions of the Council of 
Association.156 These provisions entitled a Turkish national who 
belonged to the regular employment market for at least four years to 
have free access to employment of his choosing.157 The ECJ had to 
decide whether the decisions of the Council of Association had direct 
applicability in the EC legal order.158 The Court held that some 
provisions of the decisions of the Council of Association had direct 
effect for Turkish nationals if they were clear, unconditional, and 
directly applicable.159 In this case, the Netherlands opposed the 
notion of direct applicability of the decisions based on the fact that 
the decisions are conditional in nature and not precise enough 
because they required national transposition into the domestic legal 
regimes.160 In rejecting these arguments, the ECJ held that it had 
 
 154. Case C-192/89, Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1990 E.C.R. I-
3461, ¶ 9; see also TREVOR HARTLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAW 224 (2007) (stating that the ECJ in Sevince “held that acts (decisions) adopted 
by [councils of association under association agreements] can be directly effective 
in the Community if they comply with the same requirements as apply to 
agreements between the Community and non-Member States”). 
 155. Sevince, 1990 E.C.R. I-3461, ¶¶ 3-4. 
 156. Id. ¶ 4. 
 157. See id. (explaining that Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 2/76 provided that after 
five years of legal employment in a Member State of the Community, a Turkish 
worker shall “enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of 
his choice,” and that Article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 provided that a Turkish worker 
who “duly register[s] as belonging to the labour force of a Member State is to 
enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of his choice after 
four years’ legal employment”). 
 158. Id. ¶ 5(2). 
 159. See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 26 (setting forth criteria to judge whether the Council of 
Association’s decisions that are at issue in this case have direct effect and deciding 
in the affirmative). 
 160. See id. ¶ 22-23, 25 (replying implicitly to the Netherlands’ argument that 
the decisions allowed national authorities to establish procedures for applying the 
rights granted to Turkish workers and ruling that those provisions simply allowed 
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previously permitted the execution of decisions without national 
transposition.161 Moreover, the Court followed the opinion of 
Advocate General Darmon, who argued that the purpose and nature 
of these decisions ought to be appraised in light of the general aims 
of the Agreement and the Protocol.162 Similar to international 
agreements, the decisions of the Council of Association should be a 
priori provisions that have direct applicability in the Member States 
as long as they conform to the test adopted by the ECJ.163 The denial 
of direct effect in in Demirel did not preclude the Court from finding 
that some of the decisions of the Council of Association can have 
direct effect.164 
In following the Sevince precedent, the ECJ interpreted the 
decisions of the Council of Association to allow Turkish migrants 
legally employed in a Member State and their families to remain or 
to switch employment in that state.165 In Kuş, the ECJ held that 
 
Member States to promulgate necessary administrative procedures for the 
implementation of the decisions and did not empower them “to make conditional 
or restrict the application of the precise and unconditional right which the decisions 
of the Council of Association grant to Turkish workers”); see also KEES JAN 
KUILWIJK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE GATT DILEMMA: PUBLIC 
INTEREST VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS? 119 (1996) (detailing the Dutch 
government’s argument that the safeguard clauses in the Association Council’s 
Decisions “gave the contracting parties a unilateral power of derogation”). 
 161. See Sevince, 1990 E.C.R. I-3461, ¶ 25 (citing Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt 
Mainz v. Kupferberg, 1982 E.C.R. 3641) (responding to Netherlands’ argument 
that the decisions allowed the contracting parties to derogate from provisions on 
the rights of Turkish workers and finding that the decisions permitted derogation 
only in specific situations, and the existence of such clauses did not affect the 
direct effect test). 
 162. See id. ¶¶ 19-20 (discussing the purpose and nature of the decisions and the 
Ankara Agreement); see also KUILWIJK, supra note 160, at 119 (detailing how 
General Darmon distinguished precedent from the circumstances of the Sevince 
case). 
 163. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. 
 164. Id. ¶ 21. 
 165. See, e.g., Case C-237/91, Kazım Kuş v. Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden, 1992 
E.C.R. I-6781, ¶¶ 26, 36 (ruling that a Turkish worker who has worked within a 
Member State for the same employer under a valid work permit for more than one 
year is entitled to a renewal of his work and residence permits); Case C-355/93, 
Hayriye Eroğlu v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 1994 E.C.R. I-5113, ¶ 23 (allowing a 
Turkish national, who meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 7 
of Decision 1/80, to obtain an extension of his residence permit); Case C-434/93, 
Ahmet Bozkurt v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1995 E.C.R. I-1475, ¶¶ 10, 42 
(reciting the Council of Association’s Decision 1/80 as granting Turkish nationals 
the general right to remain employed or switch employment within a Member 
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Turkish migrants legally employed in the EU for at least one year 
have the right to remain in that employment and can rely on Article 
6(1) of the Council Decision 1/80 to extend their work permits.166 
Mr. Kuş was a Turkish national who obtained a permit to reside in 
Germany by virtue of his marriage.167 By the time he had to renew 
his residence permit, he had recently divorced his German wife.168 In 
interpreting article 6(1) of Decision 1/80 of the Council of 
Association, the ECJ held that under certain conditions Mr. Kuş was 
entitled to renew his working permit.169 In a more recent case, the 
ECJ held that Mr. Ergat, a Turkish national who had been refused 
permission to extend his German residence permit, could rely on 
Article 7 of Decision 1/80 to extend his permit.170 Mr. Ergat joined 
his parents, who were legally employed Turkish migrants in 
Germany, at the age of eight and enjoyed a right of residence for the 
purpose of reuniting his family.171 Being a resident of Germany for 
more than five consecutive years, the ECJ held that states cannot 
attach conditions to the residence of a member of a Turkish worker’s 
family after he has been cohabitating for three years with his parents; 
rather, he is entitled to enter the labor market in the host state.172 
Finally, in 2008 the ECJ revisited the saga of the Turkish workers 
with another case concerning the renewal of a working permit for an 
 
State, but rejecting a Turkish national’s ability to remain in-state if he or she is 
rendered permanently incapacitated for work); Case C-340/97, Ömer Nazlı et al. v. 
Stadt Nürnberg, 2000 E.C.R. I-957, ¶¶ 49, 64 (finding that Article 6(1) of Decision 
1/80’s work and residence rights for Turkish nationals are not lost upon a 
temporary break in work); Case C-188/00, Bülent Kurz, né Yüce v. Land Baden-
Württemberg, 2002 E.C.R. I-10691, ¶ 61 (holding that a Turkish national who 
entered a Member State on a student visa and subsequently stayed to undergo 
vocational training with an employer is a worker within the meaning of Article 
6(1) of the Council of Association Decision 1/80); Joined Cases C-317/01 & C-
369/01, Eran Abatay & Nadi Sahin v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2003 E.C.R. I-
12301, ¶ 117 (agreeing generally that Decision 1/80 of the Association Council 
allows Turkish nationals rights, under certain conditions, to remain employed and 
residents of Member States). 
 166. Kazım Kuş, 1992 E.C.R. I-6781, ¶ 26. 
 167. Id. ¶ 3. 
 168. Id. ¶ 4. 
 169. Id. ¶ 26 (declaring that Mr. Kuş was entitled to a renewal of his work 
permit even if his marriage had dissolved, so long as he “has worked there for 
more than one year for the same employer under a valid work permit”). 
 170. Case C-329/97, Ergat v. Stadt Ulm, 2000 E.C.R. I-1487, ¶ 67. 
 171. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 
 172. Id. ¶¶ 38-40. 
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au pair, Ms. Payir, and two students, Mr. Akyuz and Mr. Ozturk, 
who were employed in part-time jobs while conducting their studies 
in the United Kingdom.173 In interpreting Article 6(1) of Decision 
1/80, the ECJ held that its precedents showed that the aim of this 
provision was to “consolidate progressively the position of Turkish 
workers in the host Member State.”174 The fact that the applicants 
entered the host state as an au pair or as students did not deprive 
them of the status of workers. Because they were legally employed in 
the United Kingdom, they enjoyed the protection of Article 6(1), 
which entitled them to obtain a renewal of their working permits 
together with residency for one year.175 
The ECJ did not shy away in adjudicating even more controversial 
questions that entailed important distributive effects for welfare 
regimes of the host states where Turkish workers and their families 
were residing. According to Article 10(1) of the Council of 
Association’s Decision 1/80, Member States cannot discriminate 
against legally-employed Turkish migrant workers on the basis of 
nationality with respect to their pay and other working conditions.176 
In interpreting this provision, the ECJ held that Article 10(1) of 
Decision 1/80 has direct effect by conferring on Turkish migrants 
and their families the right to enforce non-discrimination provisions 
in the courts of the host state.177 Similarly, the Court held that 
Decision 3/80 of the Council of Association, which prohibited 
Member States from discriminating against non-nationals in the 
distribution of state welfare, had direct effect, and individuals could 
enforce it in national courts.178 Mrs. Sürül reunited with her husband, 
a student who was entitled to work sixteen hours per week, and she 
held an accessory residence permit entitling her to live in 
Germany.179 When Mrs. Sürül gave birth to a child, she was entitled 
 
 173. See Case C-294/06, Payir v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2008 ECJ 
EUR-Lex LEXIS 2271, ¶¶ 9, 13, 14. 
 174. Id. ¶ 37 (citing Case C-230/03, Mehmet Sedef v. Freie und Hansestadt 
Hamburg, 2006 E.C.R. I-157, ¶ 34). 
 175. Id. ¶ 49. 
 176. See Case C-171/01, Wahlergruppe ‘Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte 
Alternative und Grune GewerkschafterInnen/UG’, 2003 E.C.R. I-4301, ¶ 16 
(quoting Article 10(1)). 
 177. Id. ¶¶ 57, 67. 
 178. Case C-262/96, Sema Surul v. Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, 1999 E.C.R. I-
2685, ¶¶ 96-98. 
 179. Id. ¶¶ 35-38. 
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to receive a state allowance for taking care of the infant.180 In 1993, 
the German government paid Mrs. Sürül both a family and a low 
income allowance, which ended in 1994 because she did not possess 
a standard residence permit.181 The ECJ held that a Turkish national 
authorized to enter the German territory to reunite her family must 
receive from the host state the same social security benefits that 
German residents are entitled to by state law.182 In denying the family 
allowance to Mrs. Sürül based on the lack of a standard residence 
permit, the ECJ held that the government was discriminating against 
a Turkish national because German law required no such document 
of German nationals.183 
The Council of Association was supposed to implement the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on the freedoms of movement of 
services and establishment.184 While neither freedom has been fully 
achieved in the current trade regime between Turkey and the 
European Union, a standstill provision in the Additional Protocol 
requires that Member States refrain from implementing additional 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services.185 This means that the restrictions that were in place 
at the time of the Agreement will remain valid, whereas new 
restrictions on these freedoms will be unlawful because the baseline 
of the Agreement established that Turkey and the EEC committed to 
move forward towards the progressive elimination of any restriction 
on these freedoms.186 
The ECJ has interpreted the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services in a way that prevents Member States 
from introducing new restrictions on Turkish workers’ ability to 
establish themselves in the European Union to provide and receive 
services.187 In Tum and Dari, two Turkish nationals, Mr. Veli Tum 
 
 180. Id. ¶ 40. 
 181. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. 
 182. Id. ¶ 98. 
 183. Id. ¶ 103. 
 184. See Additional Protocol, supra note 15, art. 41(2). 
 185. Id. art. 41(1). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Joined Cases C-317/01 & C-369/01, Eran Abatay & Nadi Sahin v. 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2003 E.C.R. I-12301, ¶ 117 (prohibiting Member States 
from introducing restrictions unless they were enacted prior to the entry into force 
of the Additional Protocol). 
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and Mr. Mehmet Dari, were denied admission to the United 
Kingdom to start their own businesses.188 In their appeal, the Turkish 
nationals claimed that their immigration petition should be examined 
in light of the standstill provision included in Article 41(1) of the 
Additional Protocol.189 The ECJ held that this provision had direct 
effect, but it did not confer directly a right of establishment to the 
Turkish nationals.190 However, the Court held that Article 41(1) 
precluded the United Kingdom from adopting any new provision that 
would create stricter conditions for the establishment of a Turkish 
national in its territory than the ones already in place at the time of 
the Agreement.191 Recently, in Mehmet Soysal, the ECJ went even 
further in holding that no visa requirement was necessary in the case 
of a Turkish national who entered the territory of a Member State in 
order to provide a service on behalf of a Turkish company.192 This 
judgment received wide attention by both Turkish and E.U. officials 
interested in monitoring the ECJ judgment that voided the German 
visa requirement for a Turkish truck-driver.193  
To understand the bigger picture emerging from the ECJ 
jurisprudence in the Turkish migrant workers’ cases, one ought to 
link this jurisprudence to the European Union-Turkey trade 
relationship and the Yedaş Tarim decision. Both sets of decisions are 
relevant to understand a complex trade relationship because they 
clearly belong to the same macroeconomic strategy. There are those 
Turkish citizens who, by remaining at home have to cope with the 
increasing annual foreign trade and fiscal deficit after the 
implementation of the Customs Union.194 In this situation Turks did 
 
 188. Case C-16/05, Veli Tum & Mehmet Dari v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t., 2007 E.C.R. I-07415, ¶ 29. 
 189. Id. ¶ 30. 
 190. See id. ¶¶ 46, 52, 55 (explaining the procedural nature of Article 41(1) and 
concluding that it does not, in itself, confer rights of entry or establishment upon 
Turkish citizens). 
 191. Id. ¶ 49. 
 192. See Case C- 228/06, Mehmet Soysal, Ibrahim Savatli v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Judgment of 19 February 2009. 
 193  See Turkey’s Chief E.U. Negotiator on ECJ’s Visa Decision, TIMETURK 
ENGLISH, available at http://en.timeturk.com/turkeys-chief-eu-negotiator-on-ecjs-
visa-decision-16039-haberi.html (last visited May 18, 2009). 
 194. See ROBERT LEONARDI, COHESION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE 
BUILDING OF EUROPE 159 (2005) (depicting the recent economic situation in 
Turkey as being “out of control with very high annual deficits” and also studying 
other newly integrating countries’ economic situations). 
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not benefit from the Ankara Agreement where they chose to invest in 
a company that was put out of business by the fact that cheaper, 
high-quality goods arrived from Europe through the Customs Union, 
while cheaper, lower quality ones arrived from Asia through the 
WTO Free Trade regime. In either case, Turkish businesses were 
under the severe competitive pressure of regional and global trade 
without enjoying the benefits of E.U. membership.  
But at the same time, those Turks who migrated to seek low-
income jobs in the European Union benefited from the advantages 
offered by national welfare states. As to the Turkish migrants in 
Germany, the fact that they increasingly gained access to 
employment and social welfare benefits shows that Turkish workers 
took numerous lower income jobs during the 1980s and 1990s, 
before unskilled labor flooded the European Union from former 
Eastern European countries.195 The expansion of welfare benefits to 
Turkish immigrants through the ECJ jurisprudence put more pressure 
on E.U. Member States that were increasingly cutting back on 
welfare benefits. However, the ECJ jurisprudence indirectly created 
incentives for Turks and their families to seek low-income jobs in 
Western Europe. 
C. WTO OBLIGATIONS FOR TURKEY 
The new obligations undertaken by Turkey in the aftermath of the 
entry into force of the Customs Union with the EC change Turkey’s 
relationship with other members of the WTO and players in the 
global trade arena. Turkey became a member of the original General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1951, which created a 
multilateral trading system until the entry in force of the WTO in 
1995.196 The WTO embodies multilateral obligations among trading 
 
 195. UTA SAUMWEBER-MEYER & HANS DIETRICH VON LOEFFELHOLZ, FED. 
OFFICE FOR MIGRATION & REFUGEES (F.R.G.), IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGNERS TO 
GERMANY: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION WITH 
PARTICULAR RESPECT OF TURKISH MIGRANTS 3 (Feb. 19-21, 2006), available at 
http://migration.uni-konstanz.de/content/center/events/de/events/mexico2006/Sau 
mweber_v.Loeffelholz.pdf (reporting that a substantial part of the Turkish 
population in Germany is still low-skilled). 
 196. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, The 128 Countries That Had Signed 
GATT by 1994, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/gattmem_e.htm (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2009) (providing a list of signatories to the GATT and when each 
member joined); World Trade Organization, The General Agreement on Trade in 
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countries, and its core principle is the Most-Favoured-Nations 
clause.197 This provision requires trade to be conducted on the basis 
of non-discrimination, and all the members are bound to give each 
other a treatment in tariffs and trade that is as favorable as the 
treatment received by any other member of the WTO.198 
In 1995, Turkey notified the WTO when it was about to reach the 
final stage of implementing its Customs Union with the EC by means 
of a Decision of the Council of Association.199 However, specific 
provisions of this Decision required Turkey to align its foreign 
commercial policy to EC policies regulating the import of textiles 
and clothing.200 India challenged these provisions in the WTO 
dispute settlement body because it claimed that Turkey was 
infringing multilateral obligations by creating new quantitative 
restrictions through the Customs Union without formally acceding to 
the European Union.201 Turkey responded that the same complaint 
should have been brought against the EC as well, even though India 
insisted that the Community was not accountable for the trade 
measure adopted by Turkey.202 The WTO Panel decided that because 
the Turkey-EC Customs Union was not a member of the WTO, this 
dispute could not be subject to its dispute settlement procedures.203 
Despite Turkey’s obligations stemming from the Customs Union 
with the EC, the Panel condemned Turkey for the infringement of its 
 
Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage and Disciplines, ¶ 9, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 
2009) [hereinafter WTO Objectives] (stating that the WTO entered into force 
January 1, 1995). 
 197. See WTO Objectives, supra note 196, ¶ 7 (listing the Most Favored Nation 
principle as a general obligation that applies “directly and automatically to all 
Members and services sectors”). 
 198. See id. (summarizing Members’ obligations). 
 199. See Decision 1/95, supra note 113, art. 1 (declaring that the purpose of 
Decision 1/95 is to articulate the rules “for implementing the final phase of the 
Customs Union”); WTO Panel Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note 143, ¶ 2.17 
(noting that Turkey notified the WTO on December 22, 1995 in accordance with 
Article XXIV of GATT). 
 200. See Decision 1/95, supra note 113, art. 12(2) (mandating Turkey to “apply 
as from the entry into force of this Decision, substantially the same commercial 
policy as the Community in the textile sector including the agreements or 
arrangements on trade in textile and clothing”). 
 201. See WTO Panel Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note 142, ¶¶ 2.35-2.36, 
3.35 (discussing India’s objections to Turkey’s obligations under Decision 1/95). 
 202. Id. ¶ 3.33. 
 203. Id. ¶¶ 8.3, 9.6. 
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obligations under the WTO.204 Further, the Appellate Body upheld 
the finding of the Panel because Turkey did not show that, without 
implementing the obligations mandated by the Decision of the 
Council of Association, its access to the EC Customs Union would 
have been impossible.205 
As Galina Žucova explained in this case, “Turkey was heavily 
relying on participation of the EC as a ‘third party,’ following India’s 
refusal to bring the claim against two co-respondents. However, the 
EC took a clear stance that it will not participate in the case in either 
status, a decision which very seriously undermined [the] Turkish 
position.”206 The Turkish Textiles case demonstrates that the 
Customs Union created burdensome obligations for Turkey while the 
European Union continuously lacked accountability.  
CONCLUSION 
The unbalanced trade relationship between Turkey and the 
European Union described in this Article remains one of the most 
significant causes of the backlash among Turkish legal and political 
elites over the constant refusals of E.U. membership. In this 
perspective, it is not surprising that the Turkish lawyers drafting the 
plaintiff’s brief in Yedaş Tarim pointed blame at the longstanding, 
asymmetrical Turkey-European Union trade relationship. In the 
realm of the Customs Union, the accession of Turkey created 
burdensome obligations for the country. Further, because of the 
provisions on free movement stemming from the Association 
Agreement, Turkish migrant workers in Europe are entitled to a full 
protection of their right to free movement in the common market in 
the same way as E.U. citizens because the lower income jobs they 
are performing are essential to Western European societies. 
However, when Turkish nationals are local entrepreneurs at home, 
they are reminded that they are not E.U. members, and they have no 
 
 204. See id. ¶¶ 9.44, 9.207-.208 (finding that Turkey’s quantitative restrictions 
imposed on nineteen categories of textile imports from India violated its 
obligations under the GATT). 
 205. See WTO Appellate Body Report on Turkish Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 58, 
62-63 (finding that because alternative measures were available to Turkey that 
would have satisfied all of its obligations, Turkey’s decision to implement the 
quantitative restrictions at issue is not excused under Article XXIV of GATT, and 
therefore the restrictions are not justified). 
 206. ŽUKOVA, supra note 84, at 282. 
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reason to rely on such privileges. Yedaş Tarim, a Turkish company 
relying on Turkey’s future accession to the European Union for its 
business, could not recover the damages created by the fact that the 
Turkish economy and balance of trade worsened rather than 
improved in the aftermath of the EC Customs Union.  
This Article suggests understanding the Yedaş Tarim litigation as a 
response to the disappointment of the Turkish elites, especially the 
ones who were most committed to Turkish membership in the 
European Union. Even though the CFI and the ECJ departed from 
using the doctrine of promissory estoppel as suggested by the 
plaintiff to create liability for the European Union in favor of Turkey, 
this case points to the asymmetrical trade relationship between the 
two parties. While the Luxembourg Courts might not be the most 
appropriate fora to clarify the costs and benefits of the E.U.-Turkey 
trade relationship, but in Yedaş Tarim, the Courts lost a chance to 
assess the existence of major imbalances created by the obligations 
in the overall trade regime between Turkey and the European Union.  
By focusing on the reasons of the Turkish distrust towards Brussels, 
Yedaş Tarim marks an important shift of perspective towards the 
current debate on Turkish membership to the European Union. In 
this respect, this Article suggests reassessing macroeconomic 
implications created by the Ankara Agreement, the Customs Union, 
and the promises of accession by Brussels vis à vis Turkish legal and 
political elites, local businesses, and immigrant workers in the 
European Union. 
 
